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I. INTRODUCTION
The Polish law on combating unfair competition is currently governed by 
two underlying laws: the Act of 16 April 1993 on Combating Unfair Compe-
tition (Ustawa o zwalczania nieuczciwej konkurencji, hereinafter referred to 
as CUC1), and the Act of 23 August 2007 on Combating Unfair Market Prac-
tices (Ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym, here-
inafter referred to as CUMP2). Both acts coexist, although it is not easy to 
separate their objective3 and subjective4 scope. The assumption that CUMP 
is limited only to relations between entrepreneurs and consumers (business 
to consumer relations – B2C) and CUC to relations between entrepreneurs 
(business to business relations – B2B) is overly simplified. Such a distinction 
is difficult to make because certain market behaviours, regardless of wheth-
er the relationship is B2C or B2B, will simultaneously affect the interests 
of various market players. The assumption that CUC protects the interests 
of entrepreneurs and that CUMP protects the interests of consumers would 
be wrong.
The purpose of this paper is to indicate that both laws are aimed at pro-
tecting the same interests. The criteria of protected interests, rather than the 
relation (B2C and B2B), should be decisive and taken into consideration in 
further reforms of Polish law on unfair competition.
II. THE ACT OF 1926 ON COMBATING UNFAIR COMPETITION
Traditionally, the provisions relating to the prevention and combating of 
unfair competition were contained in one single act. Originally, it was the Act 
of 2 August 1926 on Combating Unfair Competition (hereinafter referred to 
1 Consolidated text, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws, JL] 2018, item 419.
2 Consolidated text, JL 2017, item 2070.
3 Namysłowska (2007): 1287.
4 Giesen (2014): 34–38.
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as CUC19265), CUC 1926 was the first Polish Act on combating unfair com-
petition, and it remained in force until 1939. After the war, due to the disap-
pearance of competition between nationalized entities in Poland, CUC 1926 
was not used, although it was still binding until 1993, when it became finally 
abolished and replaced by CUC.
The adoption of the Act of 1926 was preceded by a draft of the Act on 
the Rights on Enterprises and on Combating Unfair Competition prepared by 
Fryderyk Zoll,6 who stated that it was to be ‘a full realization of the civilistic 
approach to the fight against unfair competition – an approach based on the 
recognition of the entrepreneur’s objective right.’ In the assumptions of the 
founders of CUC 1926, its main objective was to prevent acts of unfair com-
petition (dishonesty of competition) directed against entrepreneurs. As em-
phasized in the literature, ‘a vigorous, strong and comprehensive repression 
of unfair competition should become one of our primary tasks.’7 It was also 
explained that an act of unfair competition takes place when ‘the competi-
tiveness exceeds the boundaries outlined by the general interest and violates 
economic freedom and the interests of other individuals, using methods con-
trary to good manners adopted in a given environment.’8 As a result, in order 
to safeguard against unfair competition, protection was granted to entrepre-
neurs whose rights to the enterprise (its attractive power) were infringed by 
the actions of another entrepreneur (a competitor). The criminal protection 
provided for in the Act was of an auxiliary nature and was also considered as 
a form of (auxiliary) consumer protection.
At the beginning, the pre-war legislator was concerned only with the 
interests of entrepreneurs operating on the market, whereas neither the in-
terest of the client nor the interest of the consumer was taken into account.9 
However, as early as the 1930s, there were already views expressed in Ger-
man law that law concerning unfair competition was not only to protect the 
particular interest of the entrepreneur, but also to play a social role and 
protect fair competition as a good in itself. Giving the entrepreneur a central 
role would be contrary to the essence of competition, since its protection 
is also in the interest of other participants in commercial life.10 The same 
trend was observed in Polish law. Thus already in CUC 1926 the need to 
protect the consumer was recognized and the consumer’s interest was iden-
tified with the public interest. The drafters of the 1926 Act strove to ensure 
that the adopted solutions would lead to fair competition and, consequently, 
also affect the entire economic turnover, and thus also the situation of the 
consumer. Along with the development (in the second half of the twentieth 
century) of the law on combating unfair competition, it was assumed that 
 5 JL 1926, No. 9, item 559.
 6 Mayzel (1926b): 339–345.
 7 Kraus, Zoll (1929): 16. 
 8 Dauman (1937): 153. Also: Mayzel (1926b): 339. 
 9 Szydło (2016): 31.
10 Giesen (2014): 35–36 and the literature cited there.
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the aim of the regulation was not only to protect the entrepreneur, but also 
the consumer and the general public.11
On the other hand, however, on the grounds of CUC 1926 only an entre-
preneur had a right of action. According to Article 1 sec. 2 and 3 of CUC 1926, 
in a situation of an infringement of rights, the harmed entrepreneur could de-
mand that the offender refrain from acts that are harmful, remove the grounds 
that could cause confusion amongst recipients, return the unjust enrichment, 
as well as compensate and repair the damage in the event of bad intention 
or obvious negligence. However, the literature argued that, exceptionally, in 
the situation described in Article 4 of CUC 1926 (referring to geographical 
indications), collective legitimacy (actio popularis) was permissible. Claims 
for protection could be raised by manufacturers producing goods, their joint 
representation (if they had legal capacity) and any entrepreneur selling the 
products in question.12 
III. THE ACT OF 1993  
ON COMBATING UNFAIR COMPETITION
1. Fair competition
Already in the draft from 199213 of CUC it was proposed that the new act 
should regulate the prevention and combating of unfair competition in the 
public interest, the interest of entrepreneurs and the interest of customers, 
especially consumers. The above proposal was accepted without changes in 
the adopted text of the Act of 1993.
From the Explanatory Memorandum of the draft of CUC it follows that 
the legislator’s objective was to secure the existence of fair competition as 
a principle governing the economy, as well as to ensure fairness of compe-
tition. When drafting the Act, the Polish legislator took into account: the 
public interest, the interest of entrepreneurs and the interest of customers, 
including consumers. The Act was intended to eliminate unfair practices in busi-
ness activity which lead to its deformation and falsification. The proposed 
solution expressed the ‘thought of the versatility of the proposed regulation 
by taking into account the interests of the general public, entrepreneurs and 
consumers. This means that the infringement of each of the interests men-
tioned above has the same significance for the assessment of an activity as 
an act of unfair competition.’14
11 Szwaja, Kubiak-Cyrul (2019): 81–82.
12 Kraus, F. Zoll (1929): 128, 232–235.
13 The Explanatory Memorandum of the CUC draft, Parliamentary printing (Druk sejmowy) 
of 18.05.1992, no. 278 Available on: <biblioteka.sejm.gov.pl> (hereinafter referred to as the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the CUC draft).
14 The Explanatory Memorandum of the CUC draft: 3.
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2. Public interest
One of objectives of CUC, set out in the first place, is the protection of 
the public interest. And although the notion of public interest is not defined 
in the Act, it should be understood as the interest of the whole society and 
community, and not the interest of individuals or a specific group of en-
tities (entrepreneurs, customers, consumers). It is argued that the public 
interest ‘consists in maintaining competition as one of the “flywheels” of the 
economy and in its proper and effective functioning, as well as in compli-
ance with the law, fair and undistorted functioning.’15 This interest must be 
understood broadly as ‘the interest of many unidentified entities genuinely 
affected by the behaviour of the wrongdoer.’16 The Polish Supreme Court 
(Sąd Najwyższy) argued that a breach of public interest occurs ‘when the ef-
fects of certain actions are common, affecting all potential entities on a given 
market, and not only a strictly defined group of them. The public interest is 
infringed when the prohibited activities limit the proper conditions for the 
functioning of the market, ensuring the possibility of the emergence and 
development of competition understood as a phenomenon characterizing the 
functioning of the economy.’17
Therefore, the public interest should be identified as contributing to the 
development of an overall economy based on legitimate competition and mu-
tual fairness. One must agree with the position expressed in the literature 
that the public interest is intertwined with the interest of other market par-
ticipants. When assessing the interests of the entrepreneur and the interests 
of the client, the public interest should also be taken into account.18 It would 
even be possible to support the view that in a situation where it is necessary 
to resolve the conflict between the interests of entrepreneurs or clients and the 
public interest, the public interest should be of decisive importance. Theoret-
ically, it could happen that certain actions, although they would infringe the 
interest of an entrepreneur or client, may be classified as acceptable precisely 
for reasons of protection of the public interest.
It should be added that CUC as such does not provide any special meas-
ures to protect the public interest. The public interest is mainly protected by 
the Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection (here-
inafter referred to as CCP).19
15 Szwaja, Kubiak-Cyrul (2019): 90.
16 Sieradzka (2016): 51.
17 The judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 20 April 2017 (III SK 21/16), Legalis. 
18 Tischner (2014): 100.
19 Consolidated text, JL 2019, item 369. According to Article 1 sec. 2 this Act provides for 
the principles and procedures applied to counteract competition-restricting practices, prac-
tices infringing collective consumer interests, use of abusive clauses in standard agreements, 
and anti-competitive concentrations of undertakings and their associations, where such prac-
tices, the use of abusive clauses or concentrations have or may have effects in the Republic 
of Poland.
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3. Interest of entrepreneurs
According to Article 2 CUC, entrepreneurs are natural and legal persons 
and organizational units without legal personality, which, by performing com-
mercial or professional activity (even if only on the side), participate in eco-
nomic activity. This definition should be understood autonomously and may 
be interpreted differently from the notion of an entrepreneur referred to in 
other acts. This will particularly apply to the definition of an ‘entrepreneur’ 
contained in Article 4(1) CCP, as well as in Article 2(1) CUMP.
In the Explanatory Memorandum of the CUC draft, it was emphasized 
that the act deliberately avoids using the term ‘economic entity’, and instead 
uses the term ‘entrepreneur’. The aim here is to determine that the Act does 
not refer only to ‘economic entities within the meaning of the Act on Commer-
cial Activity,20 but also to all persons and organizations that participate in 
economic trade by conducting economic or professional activity.’21 It is worth 
mentioning that running a business does not have to be the main goal of an 
entrepreneur, it is sufficient that the business activity is run on the side and 
does not have to be run for profit. The concept of conducting economic activity 
is also broadly defined: according to Article 1 CUC, it covers all industrial 
and agricultural production, construction, trade and services. The Act also ap-
plies to so-called freelance professions, to the extent that their representatives 
themselves, or as companies, engage in economic activity as entrepreneurs.
CUC refers to all Polish entities conducting business activity, as well as 
foreign natural and legal persons (Article 4 CUC), who benefit from the rights 
resulting from the provisions of the Act pursuant to international agreements 
binding the Republic of Poland or on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. 
There is no doubt that foreign entities conducting business activity on the ter-
ritory of Poland must comply with the principles of fair competition.
4. Interest of clients (and consumers)
CUC also protects the interest of clients, although it does not define the 
concept of ‘client.’ The notion of a client is defined not only in Article 1 CUC, 
but also in Articles 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16, which in particular cover torts 
of unfair competition, and in Articles 24 and 25 on prohibited acts. The notion 
of a client should be understood broadly. A client may be not only a consumer 
as defined in Article 221 of the Polish Civil Code of 23 April 1964 (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the CC22), and thus a natural person who performs a legal 
transaction with an entrepreneur not directly related to their business or pro-
fessional activity. It can also be another entrepreneur purchasing the means 
20 Act of 23 December 1988 on Commercial Activity (Ustawa o działalności gospodarczej, 
JL 1988, No. 41, item 324). The Act was repealed in connection with the entry into force of the 
Commercial Activity Law (Prawo działalności gospodarczej) of 19 November 1999, JL No. 101, 
item 1178. 
21 The Explanatory Memorandum of the CUC draft: 4. 
22 Consolidated version JL 2019, item 1145.
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of production or services or goods for resale (an indirect purchaser), as well 
as entities that are final recipients, which cannot be classified in any of the 
previous categories, such as associations, schools, courts, hospitals, offices. 
A client within the meaning of CUC is any market participant to whom the 
activities of other trade participants (entrepreneurs), offering different goods 
or services, are addressed, regardless of whether the client is an entrepreneur 
or a consumer. The decisive factor is that they are a client of the entrepreneur.
The amendment of 2007 of Article 1 CUC, whereby the phrase ‘especially 
consumers’ was repealed, did not constitute a change in the scope of CUC 
regulation. This action has an impact on the CUC’s interpretation that the 
consumer’s interest is not worthy of special emphasis, since it is protected on 
an equal level with the interests of all other clients. Moreover, the position 
that the protection of consumer interests is outside the scope of CUC is not 
justified. Consumers are not protected as a weaker, more vulnerable group of 
market participants,23 but they are protected as any other clients – a contract-
ing party of an entrepreneur. The interests of the customer are placed on an 
equal level with the interests of the trader and the public interest.24 Article 1 
of CUC makes no distinction in this respect.
There may be doubts, in connection with the amendment of Article 1 CUC 
and the entry into force of CUMP in 2007, as to whether it is possible to refer 
on the grounds of CUC to the model of an ‘average consumer’ which was devel-
oped in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice the European Union (CJEU) 
and is currently defined in CUMP. According to Article 2 sec. 8 CUMP, an 
‘average consumer’ means ‘a consumer who is reasonably well informed, ob-
servant and circumspect; the assessment is made taking into account social, 
cultural, linguistic and cultural factors, and the consumer’s belonging to a par-
ticular group of consumer’s, understood as a clearly identifiable group of con-
sumers who are particularly vulnerable to the impact of the market practice 
or to the product to which the market practice relates because of particular 
characteristics such as age, or physical or mental disability.’25 
Although it does not result from the content of CUC itself, I believe that 
actions that may threaten or violate the interest of the client-consumer should 
be assessed from the perspective of the average consumer. It is also undisput-
ed in the literature that when assessing whether a given behaviour could be 
misleading (Articles 5, 6, 10, 13, 16 CUC) or otherwise influence the consum-
er’s decision (Articles 12, 15, 16 and 17a CUC), one should refer to the model 
23 A consumer treated as a vulnerable party in need of special protection is identified under 
CUC, CUMP and CC.
24 Tischner (2014): 104.
25 The adoption of such a model is in the view of the EU legislator, in line with the principle 
of proportionality and aims at enabling the effective application of the remedies contained in 
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council 
Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005: 22–39.
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of an average consumer.26 At the same time, it does not seem justified that the 
model of an average consumer should be applied to the client-entrepreneur. 
It is sufficient that only the customer’s interest is threatened or violated 
for any action to be qualified as an act of unfair competition. Article 3 CUC 
regulates that an act of unfair competition is an act or omission that threatens 
or infringes the interest of another entrepreneur or customer. In this regard, it 
is not necessary for the application of Article 3 CUC to threaten or infringe the 
interest of another entrepreneur. It is enough that the interest of the client is 
threatened or infringed. In such a situation, however, the issue of active court 
legitimacy remains valid.
Although CUC aims at preventing and combating unfair competition in 
the interest of public, entrepreneurs and clients, currently only entrepreneurs, 
and to some extent also a national or regional organization whose statutory 
aim is to protect the interests of entrepreneurs, have active court legitimacy. 
Such a possibility does not exist for a natural person who is not an entrepre-
neur, and thus neither does it exist for a consumer. In the justification of the 
CUC draft, it was stressed that only the entrepreneur is actively entitled to 
take legal action, and the Act does not provide for actio popularis. A single cli-
ent-consumer has no court legitimacy. The consumer may exercise their rights 
on the basis of other legal regulations. In a case where the infringement of an 
individual customer’s interest constitutes a manifestation of unlawful activity 
to a greater extent, the active court legitimacy may be held by a consumer 
organization.27
IV. THE 2007 ACT  
ON COMBATING UNFAIR MARKET PRACTICES
The purpose of CUMP was to implement into the Polish legal system Di-
rective 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices. The implemented directive 
is based on the model of ‘full harmonisation’ which has affected the way it 
has been transposed into national legislation28. Full harmoniztation means 
that Member States had to adopt the provisions contained in the Directive in 
a strict manner. They may not introduce rules that are stricter than those set 
in the directive29.
26 Szwaja, Kubiak-Cyrul (2019): 92, Tischner (2014): 104.
27 Justification of the draft of CUC: 7.
28 Szwaja, Tischner (2007): 1117; Kukiel-Kryńska (2007): 989.
29 ‘It is important to distinguish between minimum and maximum (or full) harmonisation 
requirements in directives. In the case of minimum harmonisation, a directive sets minimum 
standards, often in recognition of the fact that the legal systems in some EU countries have al-
ready set higher standards. In this case, EU countries have the right to set higher standards than 
those set in the directive.’ More at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=uriserv-
%3Al14527> [accessed 27 March 2020].
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According to Article 1 CUMP, the Act defines the rules of combating unfair 
market practices in the interest of consumers and the public.
1. The interests of consumers
The provisions of CUMP protect the interests of the consumer. Pursuant 
to Article 2(2), the term ‘consumer’ should be understood as a consumer within 
the meaning of Article 221 CC. According to the drafters of the Code, the refer-
ence to the Civil Code was proposed to achieve systemic compliance.30 This ar-
gument seems to be justified. The reference to Article 221 CC is also contained 
in other acts, including Article 4(12) CUC. It is assumed in the literature that 
the term ‘consumer’ should be understood identically with respect to the CC, 
CUC and CUMP.31
The consequence of such an assumption is the necessity to apply the same 
interpretation of this term on the grounds of the CC and CUMP. However, the 
problem is that CUMP refers to different types of market practices which are 
defined in its Article 2(4). Therefore, there is a justified doubt as to whether 
the acts of law (or legal transactions – czynność prawna)32 involving a consum-
er and an entrepreneur within the meaning of Article 22(1) CC are the same 
as the market practices defined in CUMP. In fact, CUMP refers to a broader 
set of activities: any unfair market practices, and not only to legal transac-
tions involving a consumer and an entrepreneur. It is reasonable to claim 
that CUMP concerns any activities (including factual activities – czynność 
faktyczna) conducted by the consumer in relation to the product offered by the 
entrepreneur. It is therefore proposed that the interpretation of CUMP, which 
must be in accordance with Directive 2005/29, should overlook the limitation 
laid down in Article 221 CC. Thus, CUMP would not be limited to situations 
where a consumer takes legal actions against an entrepreneur. On the other 
hand, it is argued that such an interpretation is contra legem because if the 
wording of the provision is unequivocal there are no grounds for applying an 
interpretation in accordance with the EU Law.33
Article 1 of Directive 2005/29 imposes that the protection concerns only 
the economic interests of the consumer. This assumption is also reflected in 
recital 7 of the preamble to Directive 2005/29, which states that the Direc-
tive ‘addresses commercial practices directly related to influencing consumers’ 
transactional decisions in relation to products. It does not address commer-
30 See Parliamentary printing (Druk sejmowy) 1682, Government bill on combating unfair 
market practices. Available at: <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc5.nsf/opisy/1682.htm> (hereinafter 
referred to as the Explanatory Memorandum of the CUMP draft).
31 Szwaja, Kubiak-Cyrul (2019): 92. There were also some opinions that the reference in the 
CUMP to Article 22(1) CC is inappropriate, because such a definition of ‘consumer’ is defective in 
the CUMP. See Tischner (2012): 126.
32 The CC does not provide any definition of acts of law (legal transactions). It is generally 
understood to be a complex legal event (zdarzenie prawne) in which the only necessary, or re-
quired element is a declaration of intent. Kępiński (2011): 412. 
33 Tischner (2012): 126.
Interests protected under the Polish law on combating unfair competition 59
cial practices carried out primarily for other purposes, including, for example, 
commercial communication aimed at investors, such as annual reports and 
corporate promotional literature. It does not address legal requirements relat-
ed to taste and decency which vary widely among the Member States.’
Also in the Guidance for the application of Directive 2005/29, the Euro- 
pean Commission states that this Directive does not refer to national provisions 
aimed at protecting non-economic interests. The Directive does not cover na-
tional rules on protecting human dignity, preventing sexual, racial and religious 
discrimination or on the depiction of nudity, violence and antisocial behaviour.34
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in Article 1 CUMP that it concerns 
only the economic interests of consumers, it should be assumed that only such 
interests are at stake in accordance with the assumptions underlying Direc-
tive 2005/29. This is further reflected in Article 4, according to which a prac-
tice is unfair when it distorts or may distort ‘the market behaviour of the 
average consumer.’ Such an understanding of consumer interests is consistent 
not only with Directive 2005/29 but also with CUC. It is also stressed in the 
literature that CUC concerns only the protection of the economic interests of 
participants in economic trade.35
2. Public interest
While some authors argue that in CUMP the consumer interest plays the 
primary (priority) role, and that the public interest should be taken into ac-
count only in the second place,36 in my opinion such a view is not justified in 
the construction of the Act itself. Both the interest of consumers and the pub-
lic interest should be equally protected.
It should be noted that the public interest, although mentioned in Article 1 
CUMP, was not mentioned explicitly in Article 1 of Directive 2005/29.37 Article 1 
of the Directive merely states that one of its objectives is also to ‘contribute to the 
proper functioning of the internal market.’ Therefore, Robert Stefanicki argues 
that, despite the omission of the term ‘public interest’ in Directive 2005/29, its 
objectives and those of CUMP are consistent.38 Such a position is also confirmed 
by the Explanatory Memorandum of the CUMP draft. This states that the pub-
lic interest should be understood as ‘ensuring fair and undistorted competition 
by protecting the overriding interest of the weaker market participants – con-
sumers.’39 However, in my opinion this interpretation is too narrow, because 
the public interest should not be perceived only from the point of view of the 
consumer. The reference in CUMP to the notion of ‘public interest’ allows the 
34 See Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Com-
mercial Practices, COM(2016)320 final: 10.
35 Szwaja, Kubiak-Cyrul (2019): 87. 
36 Michalak (2018): 49.
37 However, the notion of public interest was mentioned in recital 5 of the preamble and in 
Article 11(2) of Directive 2005/29.
38 Stefanicki (2009): 97–98.
39 Explanatory Memorandum of the CUMP draft: 15.
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assumption that the public interest under both Acts (CUMP and CUC) should 
be interpreted in the same way. The common goal of both legal acts is to ensure 
fair and undistorted competition, which entails the protection of the interests of 
all market participants.
3. The interests of entrepreneurs
In CUMP, however, the interests of an entrepreneur are not mentioned, 
as is the case in CUC. Nevertheless, it should be assumed that the interest of 
an entrepreneur is also indirectly protected in CUMP through the protection 
of the public interest. One of the components of public interest is the interests 
of the entrepreneur.40
V. CONCLUSIONS
1. Polish law on combating of unfair competition has its roots in CUC 
1926. At the time of its adoption the Act was modern and frequently applied. 
CUC 1926 referred to the relations between entrepreneurs, and its main ob-
jective was to protect the interests of entrepreneurs. However, it was noted 
that delicts of unfair competition may turn against consumers as well.
The Act of 1993 (CUC) provides for the protection of the public interest, the 
interest of entrepreneurs and that of clients. These interests are intertwined 
and cannot be separated. It is not appropriate to consider that one of these 
interests should be given priority. Despite this assumption, only the entre- 
preneur has an active court legitimacy. In the event of a breach of consumer 
interests, the consumer would not be entitled to raise claims under CUC
At the same time, the main beneficiary of CUMP is to be the consumer, 
who is the weaker party participating in the market turnover. This Act is also 
intended to protect the public interest. The interests of entrepreneurs will also 
be protected indirectly through the protection of public interest. The Acts can-
not be treated separately and independently. The primary goal of both Acts is 
to guarantee fair competition. However, each Act puts different emphasis on 
securing the interests of certain market participants, which is reflected pri-
marily in granting active court legitimacy only to some entities. 
2. Directive 2005/29 introduced a separation of the protection of consumer 
interests in relation to entrepreneurs (B2C) and the protection of the interests 
of entrepreneurs in relation to entrepreneurs (B2B). This separation was not 
recognised in Polish law on combating unfair competition, which was based 
on the model of integrated protection. Basically CUC protects the public inter-
est, the interests of entrepreneurs and the interests of clients, including con-
sumers. These interests are, as a rule, interrelated and cannot be separated. 
40 Michalak (2008): 49.
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CUC refers to acts of unfair competition, which concerned both, the relations 
between entrepreneurs (B2B) and the relations between an entrepreneur and 
a consumer (B2C). A characteristic example of the latter is Article 17a CUC. 
Undoubtedly, also other delicts (torts), mentioned in Article 10 or Article 13 
CUC, for example, refer to relations with consumers, too. 
Since Directive 2005/29 covers only B2C relations, the problem arises of 
whether it is possible to draw a clear distinction between such practices and 
B2B practices. Only theoretically is such a distinction easy to make, but in 
practice it is more difficult to draw a line between unfair market practices 
and acts of unfair competition. This is because the relationship between the 
interests of all market participants is like a vessel. The injury of the interest 
of the one of the market participants has consequences that can be felt by the 
other participants. 
Looking back, the implementation of Directive 2005/29 has proved to be 
flawed in many respects. The method of implementation, which aimed to sep-
arate the scopes of both legislative acts in regard to B2B and B2C relations 
in the model of integrated protection, is practically impossible to follow. A full 
adoption of this method would mean a break with the existing concepts, the 
acquis of the judicature and jurisprudence established on the basis of the Act 
on combating unfair competition. 
3. Taking into account all the circumstances set out above, the best solution 
would be to adopt a new legislative act which would combine the provisions 
of both earlier acts (CUC and CUMP). The adoption of a single legislative act 
aimed at ensuring fairness in trade would also require rethinking the way in 
which the Directive should be implemented. On the other hand, I also believe 
that the solutions adopted in CUC should not be abandoned. The Act proved 
to be an effective guarantor of fairness in trade.
Jakub Kępiński
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
jakep@amu.edu.pl
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3738-1818
Dauman, J. (1937). O „nieuczciwej konkurencji” de lege ferenda. Miesięcznik Prawa Handlowego 
i Wekslowego 5/8: 152–155.
Giesen, B. (2014). Przedmiot ochrony przewidzianej ustawą o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkuren-
cji. Monitor Prawniczy 6: 34–38.
Kępiński, M. (2011). Civil Law. General Part, [in:] W. Dajczak, A.J. Szwarc, P. Wiliński (eds.), 
Handbook of Polish Law. Warsaw: 403–420.
Kraus, A., Zoll, F. (1929). Polska ustawa o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji z objaśnieniami 
dra Alfreda Krausa i dra Fryderyka Zolla. Poznań.
Kukiel-Kryńska, A. (2007). Implementacja dyrektyw opartych na zasadzie harmonizacji pełnej 
na przykładzie dyrektywy o nieuczciwych praktykach rynkowych. Monitor Prawniczy 18: 
989–994.
Mayzel, M. (1926a). O zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji. Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 5: 193–201.
Mayzel, M. (1926b). O zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji (Dokończenie). Przegląd Prawa Han-
dlowego 8: 339–345.
Jakub Kępiński62
Miąsik, D. (2014). Objaśnienie do art. 24, [in:] T. Skoczny (ed.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji 
i konsumentów. Komentarz [Online]. Legalis. Warsaw.
Michalak, A. (2008). Przeciwdziałanie nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym. Komentarz. Warsaw.
Namysłowska, M. (2007). Nowa ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym. 
Monitor Prawniczy 23: 1287–1292.
Namysłowska, M. (2014). Czarna lista nieuczciwych praktyk handlowych a granice prawa 
zwalczania nieuczciwej konkurencji w Unii Europejskiej. Analiza prawnoporównawcza. 
Warsaw.
Sieradzka, M. (2008). Ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym. Komen-
tarz. Warsaw.
Sieradzka, M. (2016). Objaśnienie do art. 1, [in:] M. Zdyb, M. Sieradzka (eds.), Ustawa o zwalcza-
niu nieuczciwej konkurencji. Komentarz. Warsaw: 35–63.
Stefanicki, R. (2009). Ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym. Komen-
tarz. Warsaw. 
Szwaja, J., Tischner, A. (2007). Implementacja dyrektywy 2005/29/WE o zwalczaniu nieuczciwych 
praktyk handlowych do prawa polskiego. Monitor Prawniczy 20: 1117–1122.
Szwaja, J., Tischner, A. (2014). Odpowiedzialność cywilnoprawna za czyny nieuczciwej konku-
rencji, [in:] M. Kępiński (ed.), System prawa prywatnego. Volume 15: Prawo konkurencji. 
Warsaw: 581–638.
Szwaja, J., Kubiak-Cyrul, A. (2019). Objaśnienie do art. 1, [in:] J. Szwaja (ed.), Ustawa o zwalcza-
niu nieuczciwej konkurencji. Komentarz. Warsaw: 78–100.
Szydło, M. (2016), Wprowadzenie, [in:] M. Zdyb, M. Sieradzka (eds.), Ustawa o zwalczaniu nie-
uczciwej konkurencji. Komentarz. Warsaw: 27–34.
Targosz, T. (2012). Ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym – model ochro-
ny, zasady, zakres ochrony, implikacje dla systemu prawa konkurencji i konsumentów, [in:] 
E. Nowińska, D. Kasprzycki (eds.), Nieuczciwe praktyki rynkowe. Ocena regulacji. Cracow: 
29–52.
Tischner, A. (2012). Pojęcie „przeciętny konsument” w ustawie o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym 
praktykom rynkowym na tle prawa i orzecznictwa Unii Europejskiej, [in:] E. Nowińska, 
D. Kasprzycki (eds.), Nieuczciwe praktyki rynkowe. Ocena regulacji). Cracow: 89–126.
Tischner, A. (2014). Cele i zakres zastosowanie ZNKU, [in:] M. Kępiński (ed.), System prawa 
prywatnego. Volume 15: Prawo konkurencji. Warsaw: 89–105.
INTERESTS PROTECTED UNDER THE POLISH LAW  
ON COMBATING UNFAIR COMPETITION
S u m m a r y
The article concerns the problem of determining the relationship between the Polish Act on Com-
bating Unfair Competition of 1993 and the Polish Act on Combating Unfair Market Practices of 
2007. The problem arose when the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive was implemented in 
the Polish system in 2007. The Directive is based on the division, which was not known in the Pol-
ish Act on Combating Unfair Competition, relating to business-to-business (B2B) and business-
to-consumer (B2C) relationships. The adoption of such an artificial division has raised numerous 
problems of interpretation. A better solution would be to adopt in subsequent legislative works 
the criterion of protected interests, which are the basis of each of the analysed legal acts. Con-
sequently, it will be necessary to introduce legislative changes to the Polish Law on Combating 
Unfair Competition.
Keywords: unfair competition; unfair commercial practices; combating of unfair competition; con-
sumer; client entrepreneur; public interest
